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Article
Deleveraging the American Homeowner:
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract
Modifications
ALAN M. WHITE
The subprime foreclosure crisis has resulted in residential mortgage debt burdens far beyond
what borrowers can repay. Many economists have recognized the need to deleverage the American
homeowner. Empirical evidence from mortgage servicer reports to investors show that for the most
part, the necessary deleveraging of homeowners is not happening. This Article reports on a study of
data from more than 3.5 million subprime and alt-A mortgages, including about one-sixth of all
foreclosures pending, and about 20% of the monthly total modifications in November 2008. The key
findings are the following: (1) modifications are not reducing principal debt, they are increasing it.
Almost no modifications include significant cancellation of either past due interest or principal, and
many modifications involve capitalizing unpaid interest and fees and reamortizing the loan, which
occurred in 68% of loan modifications. Some principal was canceled, and reported as a partial loss,
for about 10% of modifications; (2) servicers are incurring huge losses for investors by foreclosing.
The average foreclosure loss on a first mortgage in November 2008 was $145,000 or about 55% of the
average amount due. Loss severities increased steadily throughout 2007 and 2008 and are expected to
worsen in 2009. In these circumstances, rational investors should accept mortgage principal
reductions corresponding to home value declines of 20% or so, were it not for the various obstacles to
servicers’ restructuring of mortgage loans; (3) fewer than half of voluntary mortgage modifications
reduced monthly payment burdens; (4) the variations among servicers in the number and quality of
modifications are enormous. This variation suggests that not every servicer is doing the maximum
possible to reach and work out terms with every defaulted borrower; (5) many modifications are
temporary. For example, some adjusted interest rate and amortization terms were only for five years,
with rate and payment increases after five years. Servicers also use balloon payments and other forms
of deferrals in order to reduce payments without reducing total debt. Thus, the totals reported by the
industry include many loans that are being modified to include deferred payment shocks, negative
amortization or other non-amortizing features of the sort that caused the foreclosure crisis; and (6)
significant numbers of mortgage loans are seriously delinquent, but not in a modification program or
in foreclosure. The foreclosure crisis is overwhelming the ability of servicers to either restructure or
foreclose on all the delinquent loans.
The Article discusses the many reasons why necessary mortgage restructuring is not happening
and proposes several policy responses.
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Deleveraging the American Homeowner:
The Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract
Modifications
ALAN M. WHITE∗
I. INTRODUCTION: DELEVERAGING MORTGAGE BORROWERS AS A
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
The subprime foreclosure crisis of 2007 was precipitated by the rapid
increase in defaults and foreclosures on subprime mortgage loans to
homeowners in the United States.1 The actual and anticipated losses from
these mortgage loans caused dramatic declines in the value of mortgagebacked securities that were issued to fund subprime and alt-A mortgages,
as well as direct losses to banks that held mortgage loans directly. As of
October 2008, the International Monetary Fund estimates that financial
institutions will write down $85 billion of subprime and alt-A mortgages
on their own books, while the various holders of mortgage-backed
securities and derivative securities will write down $500 billion as a result
of losses.2 Adding corporate debt, prime and commercial mortgage losses
and all other categories, world-wide financial losses are estimated at $1.4
trillion.3 While there were obviously weaknesses in these other debt
markets, the subprime mortgage losses hit first and triggered the broader
credit crisis.
Although financial institutions and other investors have recognized
mortgage-related losses and embarked on an unprecedented deleveraging
process,4 most of the underlying mortgages remained on the shoulders of
American homeowners by the end of 2008. Aggregate U.S. home
mortgage debt had not declined a year and a half into the crisis, despite
having reached clearly unsustainable levels. The process of foreclosing
defaulted mortgages and reselling homes at lower prices (thus substituting
∗

Assistant Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law
For an excellent timeline of the crisis of 2007–2009 with links to stories on each key event, see
Posting of Edward Harrison to Credit Writedowns, http://www.creditwritedowns.com/credit-crisistimeline#Timeline (Nov. 20, 2008).
2
Int’l Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and Deleveraging:
Macrofinancial Implications and Policy 15, tbl.1.1 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/index.htm.
3
Id.
4
See id. at 18–25 (noting that the deleveraging of banks involves recognizing losses, writing
down loans and securities on bank balance sheets, reducing exposure to additional risk and injecting
new capital).
1
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smaller mortgages for larger ones) was the only deleveraging that
occurred. Foreclosure liquidations increased monthly and reached about
one hundred thousand per month at the end of 2008,5 resulting in a total of
nearly one million foreclosures during that year.6 While the average loss
per property in November was roughly $124,000,7 much of that was from
unpaid interest. The deleveraging of homeowners would be represented
only by the difference in mortgage debt between the failed mortgage and
the new purchaser’s mortgage amount. While it is difficult to estimate the
net mortgage debt reduction resulting from this process, it was clearly less
than $100 billion.
The difference between the annual foreclosure-induced debt reduction
for homeowners of less than $100 billion and the $500 billion in expected
financial losses from mortgages was the unresolved excess leverage of the
American homeowner at the end of 2008. This missing write-down
represents mortgages that were still outstanding but not expected to be
paid. Home mortgage debt grew faster than the ability of homeowners to
service it throughout the decade preceding the crisis, and especially from
2004 to 2007. By the end of the third quarter of 2008, there were nearly
six million mortgages delinquent or in foreclosure,8 and fourteen million
homeowners are projected to have mortgage debt exceeding the value of
their property.9
Given that overleveraging was caused in part by loan structures that
deferred principal and even interest, further deferrals seem unlikely to
solve the problem. Fundamentally, the principal amount of mortgage debt
in the United States must be reduced in order to bring down delinquency
and foreclosure levels and stop the erosion in home prices. This in turn is
essential for the broader economy both because of the significant role that
home prices and new home construction play and because of the drag on
consumer spending imposed by the debt service homeowners cannot
maintain.10 While there is no consensus on the optimal level of consumer
or mortgage debt, there is broad agreement that home prices and mortgage
debt must both be reduced from their 2007 peaks at the height of the
5
HOPE NOW Loss Mitigation National Data July 2007 to November 2008, http://www.
hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE%20NOW%20Loss%20Mitigation%20National%20Data%20Jul
y%2007%20to%20November%2008.pdf.
6
Les Christie, Banks Working to Prevent Foreclosures, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http://
money.cnn.com/2009/01/29/real_estate/Hope_Now_foreclosures_easing/index.htm?postversion=20090
12912.
7
See infra Part III.E (noting that the average loss in November for mortage loans was $124,000).
8
See MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY Q308
(2008) (reporting about two percent of mortgages in foreclosure and four percent delinquent, in a
survey of forty-five million mortgages representing eighty percent of all mortgages).
9
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Apr. 10, 2008), available at
http://banking.”senate.gov/public/_files/ElmendorfSenateBankingTestimonyApril112008.pdf.
10
Id.
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bubble in order to achieve sustainable economic growth. Deleveraging
homeowners is necessary not only for the economy as a whole, but in
particular to limit losses on existing mortgage debt. As of this writing,
eighteen months into the crisis, mortgage industry efforts to restructure
loans have failed to achieve the necessary deleveraging.
Mortgage servicers face a classic collective action problem.12 Each
individual servicer in the face of declining home values wants to foreclose
on defaulted mortgages as quickly as possible in order to avoid deepening
losses. On the other hand, mortgage servicers and investors as a whole
would maximize returns on defaulted mortgages by halting or slowing the
addition of unsold homes to the inventory, allowing demand to reach
equilibrium with supply so that homes could be sold at optimal prices.
Moreover, the home price decline contributes to unemployment which
produces more mortgage defaults.
No single servicer or group of servicers, however, has any economic
incentive to organize a pause in foreclosures or to organize a deleveraging
program to benefit the group.13 If a single servicer attempts to compromise
mortgage debts in order to achieve a better return from a foreclosure sale,
other servicers who continue foreclosing will benefit as free riders
incrementally from the servicer’s forbearance or workout because they will
sell in a market with incrementally fewer foreclosed properties. Moreover,
the servicer engaged in more aggressive modifications will face short-run
resistance from investors.14 Reinforcing the collective action problem are
various contractual and legal barriers to renegotiation of mortgage debt.15
The empirical evidence presented below confirms that a year and a half
into the subprime crisis the mortgage industry has been unable to achieve
11
DEAN BAKER, THE KEY TO STABILIZING HOUSE PRICES: BRING THEM DOWN (2008), available
at http://www.cepr.net/index.php/publications/reports/the-key-to-stabilizing-house-prices:-bring-themdown; Martin Feldstein, How To Help People Whose Home Values Are Underwater, WALL ST. J., Nov.
18, 2008, at A21, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.
12
See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 5–8 (1971) (“One purpose that is . . . characteristic of most organzations, and
surely of practically all organizations with an important economic aspect, is the furtherance of the
interests of their members.”); TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
(1992) (“Collective action arises when the efforts of two or more individuals are needed to accomplish
an outcome. Activities that involve the furtherance of the interests or well-being of a group are often
examples of collective action.”).
13
Sebastian Mallaby, Paulson Behind the Curve, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2007, at A19, available
at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
14
See Gretchen Morgenson, Assurances on Buyback May Cost a Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23
2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“[S]ervic[ers] . . . may have less incentive
to help troubled borrowers who are interested in working out their loans . . . because doing so could put
the parent company on the hook to buy back a loan.”).
15
Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING
POL’Y DEB. 279, 288–90, 292 (2007); see also Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by
Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEB. 753, 760–61, 774–75 (2004) (discussing the behavior of
servicers toward borrowers and the laws regulating such action).

1112

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1107

efficient and equitable deleveraging of American homeowners.
II. STUDY METHOD AND STATUS OF MORTGAGES
This Article extends my prior study of voluntary modifications in
subprime loan pools16 by looking at a much larger database of 3.5 million
subprime and alt-A loans known as the Columbia Collateral File.17 This
larger database permits more reliable analysis of mortgage modification
and foreclosure behavior by a broad range of servicers. In addition,
beginning with the November 25, 2008 report, the Columbia Collateral
File added fourteen additional variables describing modification
agreements according to their type. These new reports allow investors to
learn, for example, whether mortgage modifications are temporary or
permanent, whether and to what extent interest is being forgiven or
postponed, and whether adjustable rate or interest-only loans are being
converted to fixed rate or amortizing loans. These data confirm that
voluntary modifications are generally increasing rather than reducing
mortgage debt and are not consistently reducing payment burdens, and that
foreclosures are resulting in extremely high loss severities. The new data
also offer additional important insights into the actions of servicers in
response to massive loan defaults, discussed below.18
The Columbia Collateral File is released monthly. For this Article I
looked at the files for January, October, November, and December of
2008.19 The 3.5 million mortgages in the November database are all
16
Alan M. White, Rewriting Contracts Wholesale: Evidence from Mortgage Remittance Reports,
36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2009).
17
The Columbia Collateral File contains current month performance data for alt-A and subprime
mortgage pools that have been securitized, and for which Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services serves
as trustee. Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, http://www.ctslink.com (containing links to investor
report files) (last visited Feb. 10, 2009). For purposes of this study, subprime is defined as loans that
do not conform to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting standards and are priced above the highercost loan threshold for reporting under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. See 12 C.F.R. §
203.4(a)(12) (2009) (describing reporting standards under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act). Alt-A
refers to loans that are below the subprime price levels and are securitized privately, i.e., not by the
government-sponsored entities (GSEs). Alt-A loans typically are loans made to borrowers with higher
credit scores but with less income documentation than required by GSEs or with negative amortization
or other product features not offered by GSEs. Many of the subprime loans in the database were made
to borrowers with “prime” credit scores: for first lien adjustable-rate mortgages, 24% of subprime loans
reflected FICO scores above 650. See Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra (containing links to
the Columbia Collateral File database).
18
Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra note 17. The data reported in this Article can be
downloaded from Wells Fargo Corporate Trust Services, supra note 17 (after registering with the web
site) as fixed-field text files. The data dictionary can be downloaded from the site as well. The
resulting data may be analyzed using a statistical software package such as SPSS (which I used), SAS
or STATA.
19
For convenience I excluded the relatively small number of mortgages securitized before 2000.
The Columbia Collateral Files for loan deals securitized in 2000 through 2007 were combined and
analyzed using SPSS for Mac and Excel. All statistics reported in this Article are based on the author’s
calculations.
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privately securitized and represent one-third to one-half of subprime and
alt-A mortgages, about 7% of all U.S. mortgages. Included are 233,000
mortgages in foreclosure and 69,000 in bankruptcy, a total of about
300,000. This compares with about 1.8 million foreclosures as of
September 30, 2008,20 so the database includes about one-sixth of all
mortgages in foreclosure.
About 29% of the mortgages in the file were delinquent on November
25, 2008 (36% for adjustable rate mortgages). This is higher than the
national rate for all mortgages and reflects the subprime and alt-A
composition of the database. Most of the mortgages modified (93%) were
first lien mortgages. Modifications were concentrated in the subprime (as
opposed to alt-A) portion of the mortgages: 88% of modified loans were
subprime, compared with 43% of unmodified loans.21 To look at it another
way, 1.4% of all subprime loans were modified in a single month,
compared with 0.1% of alt-A loans. This can be explained in part because
only 44% of the adjustable rate subprime loans are still current, compared
with 80.3% of the adjustable alt-A loans, while 28.5% of subprime ARM
loans are more than 180 days past due, compared with 9% of alt-A ARMs.
III. VOLUNTARY MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS ARE NOT REDUCING, BUT
ARE IN FACT INCREASING, MORTGAGE DEBT
The new data confirm and update my prior findings.22 Most voluntary
modifications result in increasing debt, by capitalizing unpaid interest, and
little interest or principal is being forgiven. More than half of modification
agreements still increase monthly payments rather than reduce them. The
variation in intensity and aggressiveness of modifications among servicers
continues, while loss severities on completed foreclosures continue to
mount.
For the November 2008 monthly reporting period, there were 21,219
mortgage modifications reported. The HOPE NOW coalition estimated
there were 103,000 modifications industry-wide in the month of October,23
so the Columbia Collateral File sample represents about one fifth of all
modifications.24 Most loans that were modified had been delinquent in the
20

Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Nat’l Delinquency Survey Q3 (2008).
These figures are based on the adjustable-rate mortgages with data on the margin for
calculating the adjustable interest rate (1.9 million of the 3.6 million), and defining subprime as
margins exceeding 4% over the index, a somewhat less-inclusive definition than the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act high-cost loan definition. See supra text accompanying note 17 (describing the moreinclusive definition of subprime).
22
White, supra note 16 (reporting on mortgage modifications in the period July 2007 through
June 2008).
23
See HOPE NOW Industy Data, http://www.hopenow.com/industry_data.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2009) (reporting mortgage loss mitigation statistics).
24
The 100,000 monthly modifications can be compared with the nearly 200,000 monthly
foreclosure filings, 1.8 million mortgages in foreclosure and 3 million seriously delinquent mortgages
21
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prior month’s report: about 21% were current prior to modification, 68%
were delinquent by more than 60 days and 50% were more than 120 days
delinquent. On the other hand, only 23% of the modified loans had been in
foreclosure, bankruptcy or REO (real estate owned, i.e. properties already
foreclosed but not yet sold) prior to modification, so the typical modified
loan was seriously delinquent, but had not yet been referred for foreclosure
action, a growing category whose implications I will revisit in a later
section.
A. Most Modifications Increase Debt
More than two-thirds (68%) of modifications reported in November
2008 capitalized unpaid interest and/or fees by adding them to the
outstanding balance. These loan increases are accounted as negative
prepayments, i.e. they have the opposite effect as an unscheduled principal
payment by the borrower. In 44% of modifications, the amount capitalized
was more than $5,000. The average capitalized amount was $10,800 per
mortgage out of an average balance of $225,000. A total of $165,000,000
was added to the total balance due on 21,219 modified loans.
Extrapolating these numbers to the entire mortgage market, we can
estimate that a bit less than $1 billion was added to outstanding principal
mortgage debt in a single month by voluntary modifications.
In addition, a considerable number of modifications involved deferral
of unpaid interest and/or principal and conversion of that amount into a
balloon payment. One way servicers reduce monthly payments while not
writing off unpaid interest and advances for legal fees is to reamortize the
current principal while converting unpaid interest and advances to a
balloon payment due at the end of the term. This is another device that
focuses on the immediate monthly payment cash flow problem, while
leaving homeowners with negative equity. The FDIC’s standard loan
modification approach relies on balloon payments, characterized as
deferred principal, in order to achieve payment reductions without actually
writing down principal mortgage debt.25 One thousand five hundred of the
21,200 modifications reported in November featured a balloon payment.
Nearly all of the balloon payments (90%) had due dates more than twenty
years in the future, so, by and large, the balloon feature was used as a way
to defer unpaid amounts to the end of the loan term.

at the end of the third quarter of 2008. HOPE NOW Industry Data, supra note 23 (supplying data
regarding monthly foreclosure filings); Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, supra note 20 (reporting mortgages in
foreclosure and delinquent mortgage statistics).
25
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., FDIC LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM 8–9 (2008), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/FDICLoanMod.pdf (describing the FDIC’s loan
modification methodology).
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B. Debt Writedowns Occur in a Very Small Portion of Modifications, and
Are Done by Only a Few Servicers
Mortgage modifications are widely viewed as partial debt cancellation,
and therefore as likely to create moral hazard issues.26 The fear is that
borrowers not in default will stop making payments to benefit from what
are perceived to be generous restructuring terms. In fact, more than nine
out of ten voluntary mortgage modifications in 2008 involved no
cancellation of principal, past-due interest or even late fees or expenses.
The typical modification requires the homeowner to capitalize unpaid
amounts or to convert them to a balloon payment. If the modifications
being offered were better understood, it is unlikely that they would create
much of a moral hazard effect among other mortgage borrowers.
A very small percentage of November 2008 modifications involved
reported forgiveness of interest, and only seven of the forty-three servicers
reporting modifications reported significant interest forgiveness (see Table
1). This may in part be due to spotty reporting, but it is not surprising to
see that the two servicers most engaged in reducing principal, Litton and
Ocwen, are also reporting significant numbers of loans with past-due
interest forgiven. In all, about 8% of modified loans had reported interest
write-offs greater than one monthly payment. In the remainder of
modifications where homeowners owed unpaid interest, the interest was
apparently deferred or capitalized.
Table 1

Interest written off > Current P&I
Servicer
EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION
GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC
LITTON LOAN SERVICING
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT
SOLUTIONS, INC
SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES,
INC.
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING
LLC
Total (out of 21,184 November 08
mods)

26

Frequen
Perc
cy
ent

Cumulati
ve Percent

1
10
675
890

0.1
0.6
42.0
55.4

0.1
0.7
42.7
98.1

5

0.3

98.4

24

1.5

99.9

1

0.1

100.0

1606

100.
0

E.g., David Reilly, New Bailout Again Raises Moral Hazard, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2008, at
C18, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“The danger is that loan holders who otherwise
could meet their payments would decide to fall behind to get their cut of the bailout.”).
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Modifications with a write-down of principal or interest can also be
identified based on the servicer reporting a recognized loss. About 10%
(2,147) of the modifications reported in November were associated with a
recognized loss of $1,000 or more (see Table 2).
Table 2

Modifications with loss > $1,000
Servicer

Frequenc
y

Percent

AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC

49

2.3

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC

88

4.1

CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES,
LLC

1

0.0

EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION

1

0.0

GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC

9

0.4

HOME LOAN SERVICES, INC.

9

0.4

LITTON LOAN SERVICING

1,011

47.1

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC

942

43.9

OPTION ONE

4

.2

PAUL FINANCIAL, LLC

1

.0

RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC

1

.0

SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.

23

1.1

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,INC

1

.0

SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC

1

.0

4

.2

2,145

100.0

WILSHIRE CREDIT CORP
Total (out of 21,184 November 08 mods)

In the November Columbia Collateral file about 1,100 modified loans
were reported with principal forgiveness amounts, about 1,900 had interest
forgiveness amounts reported, and about 900 had expenses forgiven and
reported. The total of 2,145 (roughly 10% of modifications) with reported
losses represent some combination of write-offs in those three categories.
Thus, in 90% or more of the modifications, there is no forgiveness of pastdue interest, expenses, or principal reported.
C.

Most Voluntary Mortgage Modifications Did Not Reduce Monthly
Payment Burdens

Payment stress is relieved in only about half of all modifications.
Comparing the initial monthly payment and current monthly payment for
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all mortgages reported modified in November, 47% showed a reduced
monthly payment, 18% showed an unchanged payment, and 35% showed
an increased payment. This is consistent with the results of my smaller
survey for the prior twelve-month period.27 Despite the increasing
attention to reducing payment burdens,28 many servicers remained
unwilling, at the end of 2008, to make sufficient reductions in interest rates
to offset the capitalization of arrears. Indeed, only 53% of November
modifications reduced the interest rate by more than 1%, nearly one in
three modified loans still bore interest at a rate above 8%, and the mean
rate after modification was 6.9%, all of this in a market where the
conventional mortgage rate was below 6%.29
D.

The Extent and Types of Voluntary Mortgage Modifications Vary
Widely among Different Mortgage Servicing Companies

Servicers vary widely in their voluntary modification activity. The
same variations observed in a small sample of nine servicers and 100,000
mortgages were found among modifications in a pool of 3.5 million
mortgages managed by eighty different servicers (see Table 3).
Modifications for the month ranged from a negligible fraction of none for
forty-seven servicers to 35% of all mortgages in foreclosure for one
servicer. Payment reductions ranged from 9% to 89% of modifications.
Interest or principal write-offs were found in 42% of one servicer’s
modifications (Litton), but were non-existent for most servicers.
Table 3: November 2008 Modifications by Servicers

% with
>$1000
writeoff
0.0%

Mods/
FC

18

&of Mods
w/ Pmt
Reduced %
61.1%

96

7.3%

0.0%

1.47%

1729
11
294

44.1%
18.2%
23.8%

2.7%
0.0%
27.7%

7.13%
0.48%
7.71%

1332

76.6%

0.1%

35.13%

Total
Mods
Accredited Home Lenders,
Inc.
American Home Mortgage
Servicing, Inc.
Aurora Loan Services LLC
Bank of America, N.A.
Bayview Loan Servicing,
LLC
Carrington Mortgage
Services, LLC

3.24%

27
See White, supra note 16 (describing relevant changes in mortgage payments during a twelvemonth period from July 2007 to June 2008).
28
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., supra note 25, at 5–6 (explaining the philosophical focus of loan
modification as a means to relieve payment pressures among mortgage borrowers).
29
E.g., FED. RESERVE BOARD, STAT. RELEASE H.15 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/20081201/ (listing the conventional mortgage rate for Nov.
28, 2008 as 5.97%).
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Total
Mods
Central Mortgage
Chase Home Finance, LLC
Citi Residential Lending,
Inc.
CitiMortgage, Inc.
Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP
EMC Mortgage Corp.
Everhome Mortgage Co.
GMAC Mortgage, LLC
Home Loan Services, Inc.
HomeQ Servicing Corp.
IINDYMAC Bank, F.S.B.
JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A.
Litton Loan Servicing
M&T Mortgage Corp.
Nationstar Mortgage LLC
Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC
Option One
Popular Mortgage Servicing
Inc.
Regions Mortgage Inc.
Residential Credit
Solutions, Inc.
Saxon Mortgage Services
Inc.
Select Portfolio Servicing
Inc.
Specialized Loan Servicing
LLC
Suntrust Mortgage, Inc.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Wilshire Credit Corp.
Total (excluding mods with
missing data or by servicers
with fewer than 8 mods)

[Vol. 41:1107

% with
>$1000
writeoff
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

Mods/
FC

209
437
36

&of Mods
w/ Pmt
Reduced %
57.9%
44.6%
30.6%

12
579

16.7%
17.5%

0.0%
0.0%

3.25%
3.20%

1168
20
71
179
117
9
76

48.9%
25.0%
67.6%
11.7%
71.8%
88.9%
42.1%

0.1%
0.0%
11.3%
4.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

9.47%
3.01%
1.52%
7.25%
1.54%
0.31%
28.00%

2318
10
114
2942
5005
141

44.7%
10.0%
85.1%
53.4%
46.8%
0.7%

41.8%
0.0%
0.0%
27.0%
0.1%
0.0%

10.03%
9.61%
0.28%
13.29%
19.11%
0.99%

16
18

68.8%
50.0%

0.0%
5.6%

4.88%
7.08%

347

46.7%

6.1%

5.30%

92

12.0%

1.1%

3.07%

11

54.5%

9.1%

3.05%

36
1159
460
19112

33.3%
12.9%
35.9%
45.3%

0.0%
0.0%
0.8%
10.1%

12.20%
0.41%
3.12%
18.83%

16.10%
7.45%
3.47%

While there were some relevant differences among servicers, none
could explain the wide variation in modification activity. Some servicers
were predominantly managing subprime pools, while others mostly
handled alt-A pools, with lower levels of defaults and accordingly of
modifications as well. On the other hand, comparing modifications to
foreclosures is a rough control for that difference, and the variations
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remain striking. The variation among servicers is an important finding in
itself, in that it reveals the ad hoc and uncoordinated nature of the entire
2007–2008 mortgage restructuring process. It also strongly suggests that
not every servicer is modifying mortgages in the most effective way nor
restructuring every salvageable mortgage loan. Indeed, the variation
suggests the opposite: many preventable foreclosures were not prevented.
E. Severe Foreclosure Loss Rates Continue Increasing
Losses on foreclosures continue to be large, exceeding 50%. The
average loss in November for all mortgage loans with losses was $124,000,
on an average loan size of $212,000—a 57% loss. About one-tenth of 1%
of the mortgages in the pool (30,816) had losses in November (excluding
the small portion of modified loans that had write-downs treated as losses).
However, about 6,800 of the unmodified mortgages with losses were
second lien mortgages. The average loss for the 21,000 first mortgages
liquidated in November was $145,000, representing an average loss of
55% of the amount due. Losses on second lien mortgages were close to
100%.
In comparison, for the modified loans with some amount of principal
or interest written off, the average loss recognized was $23,610. The
average loss across all modifications was of course much lower, given how
few modifications involved any write-offs.30 This seven-to-one difference
between foreclosure losses and modification write-offs is striking, and lies
at the heart of the failure of the voluntary mortgage modification program.
Particularly for foreclosed loans with losses above the 57% average, some
of which approach 100%, the decisions of servicers to foreclose is
mystifying. Certainly, some properties are not occupied, are owned by
investors unwilling to pay any mortgage debt, or otherwise must be
foreclosed. There is probably no good empirical test to determine exactly
how many of these wasteful foreclosure sales could have been avoided, but
the inference is strong that servicers are not fully mitigating losses. At a
minimum, there is room for servicers to be more generous in writing down
debt for the loans they are modifying, while still recovering far more than
from foreclosures in the depressed real estate market of late 2008. I will
consider some of the reasons for this apparently irrational behavior in a
later section.

30
See supra Part III.B (“In all, about 8% of modified loans had reported interest write-offs greater
than one monthly payment.”).
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IV. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
A. Not Modified, but Not Foreclosed: Informal Forbearance
The reluctance to modify mortgages is explained in part by concerns
about the importance of contractual obligations, and in part by the need to
prevent homeowners from believing that they can default on loan
obligations without consequences. It is perhaps surprising then to see that
servicers are allowing about one in seven extremely delinquent borrowers
to remain in default without being foreclosed.
While there were 15,500 loans modified in October 2008 in the
database, and 21,100 in November, there were 420,000 mortgages that
were more than 180 days past due in the November file. And while about
one-third of those were REO and about half are in foreclosure or
bankruptcy, a remarkable 64,900 mortgages are in serious default, but the
servicer is not taking legal action to enforce them. If we expand the
seriously delinquent category to include 120-day delinquencies, a point at
which servicers normally would have started foreclosure, there are nearly
127,000 defaulted mortgage contracts not being enforced, about eight
times as many as are being modified each month. In fact, in the 120- to
180-day delinquent category, the odds are less than 50/50 that a foreclosure
has been started. Who are these lucky deadbeats?
A closer examination of the defaulters with no foreclosure reveals
some of the factors at play. About 30% of the defaulted loans not in
foreclosure were second lien mortgages, compared with 8% of all loans.
Junior lien mortgages are unlikely to have much, if any, foreclosure value
in the current declining home value environment, so it is not surprising that
servicers would refrain from foreclosing them. About 12% of mortgages
in default but not in foreclosure had initial loan-to-value ratios above 95%,
compared with 5.6% for all loans. About 70% of non-enforced defaults are
subprime, compared with about 43% of all loans in the database.
However, while some non-enforcement may be rational given these
factors, a considerable amount of the non-enforcement on defaulted
mortgage contracts is due to servicers being overwhelmed and simply
unable to handle the volume.31
Moreover, even the 200,000 or so foreclosures in the Columbia
Collateral file are not all cases where the servicer is actively seeking to
recover the property. According to HOPE NOW data, the number of new
foreclosure filings is outpacing the number of monthly foreclosure sales by
about two to one,32 meaning that servicers are not selling about half the
31

Bob Ivry, Lenders Swamped by Foreclosures Let Homeowners Stay, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr.
4, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aOluOO8Vy0gc&refer=home.
32
HOPE NOW Indsutry Data, supra note 23.
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homes that have been referred for foreclosure proceedings. In other words,
in many cases foreclosures are being started but not pursued to sale.
Combining the defaulted loans not in foreclosure with the foreclosures not
being brought to sale, one could reasonably extrapolate that more than a
million mortgages are in formal or informal forbearance of some kind.
B. Modification Agreements: Temporary vs. Permanent
Fourteen percent of November modifications reported a change in the
next payment adjustment date. Of those, 9% had modified rate adjustment
dates in twelve months or less, 17% in twelve to twenty-four months, 43%
in twenty-four to thirty-six months, 19% from thirty-six to sixty months,
and the remaining 12% from five to ten years. Thus, the majority of
postponements for payment resets were for three years or less. Because of
the very limited reporting on this aspect, it is difficult to know how many
other modifications were temporary or permanent. The November
collateral file also contained a field to flag temporary modifications, but it
was blank for more than 75% of cases.33 For those reporting, there were
about four times as many permanent modifications as temporary
modifications. State regulators report that about three times as many
modifications were permanent as temporary, but data were missing on 40%
of modifications.34 It is difficult to reach any conclusions about either the
relative share of temporary versus permanent mortgage rewrites, or about
any trend. The December 2008 FDIC modification program, which if
anything is more aggressive than the practices of most servicers, calls for
interest rate concessions below current market levels to expire in five years
at most, although it does encourage permanent conversion of adjustable
rates to fixed.35
C. Adjustable-Rate to Fixed-Rate
Most modified mortgages (71%) were adjustable-rate before being
modified.36 Many of the modified ARMs were rapidly approaching their
first adjustment date: fifty-seven percent of modified ARMs had their first
interest adjustment date falling between October 2008 and June 2009, i.e.
in the nine-month period beginning just before the reporting period.
Clearly, looming rate resets were a significant factor in determining which
33

The December 2008 file “Temporary Modification” field was blank for 81% of cases.
STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE
SERVICING PERFORMANCE: DATA REPORT NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2008, at 9 (2008), available at
http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/SFPWGReport3.pdf.
35
FDIC LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM, supra note 25, at 3, 5, 9.
36
Data on ARM-to-fixed conversion are more robust in the December 2008 collateral file, from
which these summary statistics were calculated. There were still missing data for 45% of the ARMs in
the ARM-to-Fixed (Y/N) field.
34
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mortgages were modified. On the other hand, most modified mortgages
were delinquent before modification, so the looming reset was not the sole
cause of default. Two explanations are possible. It may be that servicers
chose to focus their efforts both on loans with imminent reset dates and
loans that are in default as a matter of setting priorities when faced with an
unmanageable volume of modification requests. Or it may be that
borrowers with upcoming reset dates are perceived as more worthy of aid
despite their having already defaulted.
Only about one-third of the ARMs were converted to fixed rate
mortgages, while 14% had reported adjustment rates postponed from one
to five years. It is possible that missing data account for some additional
ARM modifications, but nevertheless, the data indicates that many
adjustable-rate mortgages, perhaps as many as half, retain their adjustable
rate nature, with a risk of future payment increases.
D. Nontraditional Mortgages: Interest-Only and Negative Amortization
Fourteen percent of modified loans had been interest-only initially. Of
the modified interest-only mortgages, about one-third were reported as
having been converted to amortizing loans. Loans with negative
amortization, the so-called option-ARMs, predicted to comprise a
significant number of foreclosures in the 2009 to 2011 period, are not
being modified in any significant numbers, yet. Negatively amortizing
mortgages comprised 9% of all mortgages, 10% of delinquent loans and
foreclosures, but only 3.6% of modifications in the November Columbia
file. Two servicers, Central Mortgage and EMC, accounted for threefourths of all the modified negative amortization loans.
These
nontraditional loans were the subject of particular regulatory concern37 and
were understood to carry a greater risk of default and foreclosure.38 About
one-quarter of the modified option-ARMs had rate adjustment dates
postponed, while the rest retained their original rate adjustment dates.
One-third were coded as having been converted from amortizing to
interest-only in the modification data, an odd designation, but perhaps
meaning that those negative amortizing loans were converted to interestonly. That would represent a rather incremental reduction in the future
payment shock, which will still occur at the end of the interest-only period.
Despite the knowledge that these particularly dangerous mortgages
37
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: IMPACT ON
DEFAULTS REMAINS UNCLEAR, BUT DISCLOSURE OF RISKS TO BORROWERS COULD BE IMPROVED,
(Sept. 20, 2006); Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg.
58,609 (Oct. 4, 2006).
38
See Michael Moss & Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Pariahs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (referring to option
ARM loans as the “Typhoid Mary” of the mortgage industry).
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threatened to prolong the foreclosure crisis, little was done in 2008 to
restructure them on a sounder basis.
E. Other Modification Agreement Terms
I obtained a small sample of 2008 mortgage modification documents
from consumer attorneys and housing counselors.39 Their provisions were
consistent with the empirical evidence; they illustrated the capitalizing of
unpaid amounts, sometimes reducing interest rates to as low as 3%, but
often leaving them at 6% to 7%. Only one, a Litton modification,
cancelled any debt (interest and expenses, not principal). The remainder
all involved capitalization of arrears and a resulting increase in total debt.
When payment reductions were achieved, it was with a combination of
term extensions (some to 40 years), rate reductions and balloon payments.
The modification form agreements vary from servicer to servicer; no
industry standard form has emerged. One form included an atypical
reverter clause, providing that if the borrower fails to make payments
under the modified term for 90 days, the modified terms are canceled and
the mortgage reverts to its original terms. While there have been reports of
servicers using modification agreements as a means to obtain releases of
potential consumer claims, only one of the 2008 forms I reviewed included
broad releases, in the form of an agreement by the borrower that there are
no defenses, counterclaims or rights of set-off to the note. Another
modification from May 2008 did include a provision that the borrower
would agree to cooperate in signing replacement loan documents including
lost notes. This clause presumably deals with the common problem with
securitized mortgages, leading some courts to refuse to allow foreclosure
based on lack of standing or failure to state a claim.40
Another modification provided for the borrower to pay modification
fees of $500, which was added to the borrower’s balance. Several
modifications included the addition of attorney fees and costs rolled into
the balance. This is troubling in light of Professor Kathleen Porter’s
study.41 In a survey of mortgage servicer claims filed in bankruptcy, Porter
found that more than 20% of the arrears amounts were servicer, attorney
fees and foreclosure costs, and that the median amount claimed was

39

The modifications referred to in the following section are on file with the author.
E.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (noting that a
plaintiff’s failure to prove that he or she had standing when the foreclosure complaint was filed will
result in a dismissal without prejudice until plaintiff is able to establish standing requirements at a
future date).
41
Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV.
121 (2008).
40
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42

$1857. Her research also found that servicers did not adequately itemize
these amounts or provide supporting documentation, leading to the
inference that some of these amounts may be excessive or unearned.43
In short, the typical voluntary modifications of 2008 were not unlike
the subprime loan originations they were meant to resolve: borrowers were
kept in debt exceeding home values and exceeding their ability to amortize,
with deferrals of interest, balloon payments, and temporary low interest
rates. Nontraditional mortgages were not consistently converted to safer,
fixed-rate amortizing loans. Meanwhile, many mortgages that were not
restructured languish in limbo, neither modified nor foreclosed.
V. REPERFORMANCE AND REDEFAULT
Another aspect of the failure of the voluntary mortgage modification
process has been the high level of “redefaults” on modified mortgages, i.e.
modifications that are followed by further payment delinquencies.44 The
redefault problem has resulted in criticism of the very idea of modifying
mortgage loans.45 On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that
more aggressive modifications, especially those that reduce the principal
debt, are much less subject to high rates of redefault.46
I separately examined 3,517 mortgages modified in the January 2008
Columbia Collateral file that still appeared in the November 2008 file.47
Overall, 53% were current or due for the current month’s payment, and
19% were more than 180 days delinquent. On the other hand, only 17%
were in bankruptcy or foreclosure, and 3% were in REO, so most modified
mortgages remained active accounts ten months after modification.
Redefaults were worse than the national average in California, Florida,
Arizona and Nevada, where property values have declined significantly.
Redefaults were lower than the national average for the hard-hit industrial

42
Katherine Porter, Presentation at the University of Iowa Subprime Housing Crisis Symposium:
Falling Further: Default Costs in Home Foreclosures, at slide 6 (Oct. 11, 2008), available at
http://ppc.uiowa.edu/SubprimePresentations/KatherinePorter.pdf.
43
Porter, supra note 41, at 152–61.
44
See Charles Duhigg, Fighting Foreclosures, F.D.I.C. Chief Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting statement by Comptroller of the
Currency that more than half of mortgages modified by national banks were delinquent again after six
months).
45
See Sheila Bair, Sheila Bair’s Mortgage Miracle, WALL ST. J, Dec. 3, 2008, at A16, available
at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“Infuriated at the difficulty of modifying mortgages, the
Beltway crowd doesn’t understand that such contracts weren’t designed to let people live in houses
they can’t afford.”).
46
MERRILL LYNCH, LOAN MODIFICATIONS: WHAT INVESTORS NEED TO KNOW, (Nov. 21, 2008);
CREDIT SUISSE, SUBPRIME LOAN MODIFICATIONS UPDATE 6 (Oct. 1, 2008); LEHMAN BROTHERS, THE
LOAN MODIFICATION STORY SO FAR (Sep. 11, 2008).
47
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing the Columbia Collateral file). There
were originally 3,639, with the difference representing prepayments and liquidated foreclosures.
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states like Ohio and Michigan. This suggests that the extent of negative
home equity may play a greater role than unemployment and economic
distress.
Redefaults also varied somewhat among different servicers.
Countrywide’s modified loans performed worse than the average, with
52% more than sixty days past due, while Litton had 45% of modified
loans more than sixty days past due. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that more aggressive modifications are more likely to be successful,
although these differences are not dramatic.
Different types of modifications are expected to have different
redefault rates. This did not appear to be the case with the January 2008
modifications, although data limitations may explain the results. Only five
of the 3,634 January modifications involved any substantial write-off of
principal or interest, so there was no useful data on the performance of
modifications with principal write-downs. Comparing modifications that
reduced payments with those that increased payments, there were
surprisingly minimal differences in the delinquency status of modified
loans. About 48% of modified loans were sixty days or more past due,
whether the modified payment had been lower, higher, or the same as
before the modification. Those modifications that capitalized more than
$10,000 in past-due interest and fees had a sixty-day default rate of about
50%, and 17% foreclosures, compared with 47% sixty-day defaults and
14% foreclosures for modifications with minimal or no capitalization
(negative prepayment less than $1,000).
Loans originated in 2004 and 2005 had better reperformance rates
(58% current or thirty-days past due) than loans originated in 2006 (45%)
and 2007 (only 40% current or thirty-days past due). Not surprisingly,
FICO scores at origination were correlated with reperformance: 48% of
borrowers with scores below 550 were delinquent versus 37% of borrowers
with FICO scores above 700.
Another factor that has been identified as predictive of redefault rates
for modified loans is whether the loan was delinquent or current before
being modified. Most of the mortgages modified in November had been
delinquent in October before being modified (see Table 4).
Table 4 October Status of Mortgages Modified in November 2008

Days Past Due

Percent

Current

4,368

20.6

30 days

2,492

11.8

60 days

1,884

8.9

48
Sixty-day or more delinquent modified loans were 47% of all modified loans, compared with
52% for Arizona, 57% in California, 54% in Florida and 57% in Nevada.
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90 days

1,895

8.9

120 days

4,118

19.4

>180 days

6,427

30.3

Total

21,184

100

On the other hand, only one in five modified loans had been in
foreclosure prior to modification (see Table 5).
Table 5 October file status of November file mods

No action
Bankruptcy
Loss Mitigation
Foreclosure
REO
Total

Frequency
15,904
191
570
4,123
396
21,184

Valid
Percent
75.1
0.9
2.7
19.5
1.9
100

Modified mortgages that were current (or not seriously delinquent)
when modified were must less likely to default again than modified
mortgages that were in serious default before being modified.49 Loans
modified before default were more likely to involve conversion of an
adjustable-rate mortgage to a fixed rate to prevent a sharp payment
increase.50 These rate reset modifications represent the single category in
which servicers engaged in preventive loan restructuring, largely as a result
of the December 2007 HOPE NOW rate freeze initiative.51
It is now apparent that mortgage modifications will succeed in
achieving sustainable repayment and in reducing the aggregate debt
overhang, but only if they include reductions of principal to align debt with
property values, are permanent and fully amortizing, and are negotiated as
early as possible in the delinquency, or even before a delinquency occurs.
On the other hand, continuation of the existing model will simply defer
additional accumulated mortgage debt into 2009 and beyond, further
prolonging the foreclosure crisis.

49

CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 46, at 6; LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 46, at 2, 4.
CREDIT SUISSE, supra note 46, at 6; LEHMAN BROTHERS, supra note 46, at 2, 4.
See Edmund L. Andrews, Mortgage Aid, Within Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (noting that the Greenlining Institute estimated that only
12% of subprime borrowers would benefit from the rate freeze).
50
51
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VI. WHY ARE VOLUNTARY MORTGAGE MODIFICATIONS FAILING AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Mortgage servicing agents have thus far failed to modify mortgages in
ways that would clearly reduce investor losses for their principals. The
reasons for this failure are multiple and complex. They include contractual
limitations, economic incentives, reliance on outdated cash flow models,
and industry culture. Servicers face a variety of incentives and obstacles in
their efforts to maximize return for investors and keep their costs down.
Some have argued that servicers profit when more borrowers default and
go into foreclosure.52 The reality is somewhat more complex than that.
Mortgage servicer compensation (for securitized mortgages) is
governed by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs). Servicers receive
income from a fixed portion of monthly interest payments actually
received, from late fees and other default charges, and from the interest on
funds held for investors or escrow.53 On the other hand, servicers typically
must advance interest to investors when the borrower does not make a
payment.54 They also advance funds to third parties, like lawyers, during
the foreclosure process. The servicer recovers its advances only when the
borrower eventually brings payments current or when a foreclosure sale is
completed. In either case the servicer is entitled to recover its advances
before turning over the balance to investors. Thus, if a foreclosure sale
yields only 25% of the total amount due then the servicer still recovers
100% of interest advances and other advances from the sale proceeds,
52
Posting of Katie Porter to Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/05/piling-onfees.html (May 16, 2008, 5:56 EST).
53
See, e.g., Pooling and Servicing Agreement, Series 2005-W5, among Argent Securities,
Depositor, Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Master Servicer, and Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company, Trustee, § 3.18, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1346253/000088237706000099/d406287_ex4-1.htm (describing a typical pooling and servicing
agreement for a subprime mortgage pool).
The compensation provision is as follows:
As compensation for the activities of the Master Servicer hereunder, the Master Servicer shall be
entitled to the Servicing Fee with respect to each Mortgage Loan payable solely from payments of
interest in respect of such Mortgage Loan, subject to Section 4.03(e). In addition, the Master Servicer
shall be entitled to recover unpaid Servicing Fees out of Insurance Proceeds, Subsequent Recoveries or
Liquidation Proceeds to the extent permitted by Section 3.05(a) (ii), out of general funds in the
Collection Account to the extent permitted by Section 3.05(a) and out of amounts derived from the
operation and sale of an REO Property to the extent permitted by Section 3.13. The right to receive the
Servicing Fee may not be transferred in whole or in part except in connection with the transfer of all of
the Master Servicer’s responsibilities and obligations under this Agreement.
Additional servicing compensation in the form of assumption fees, late payment charges,
insufficient funds fees, reconveyance fees and other similar fees and charges (other than Prepayment
Charges) shall be retained by the Master Servicer only to the extent such amounts, fees or charges are
received by the Master Servicer. The Master Servicer shall also be entitled pursuant to Section
3.05(a)(vi) to withdraw from the Collection Account, pursuant to Section 3.04(h) to withdraw from any
Escrow Account and pursuant to Section 3.13(b) to withdraw from any REO Account, as additional
servicing compensation, interest or other income earned on deposits therein, subject to Section 3.06.
Id. at § 3.05.
54
See id. at § 4.03 (describing advances).
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assuming they are sufficient to cover the advances. On the other hand, if a
delinquent mortgage is modified, then the servicer will not recover the
advances made to investors on that account until the borrower repays the
servicer. This is particularly problematic for the servicer when the
advances are deferred in a balloon payment due in thirty years.
A servicer faced with a delinquent mortgage thus is faced with an
immediate and ongoing cash outflow of interest each month. If the
servicer forecloses, it will advance more money for legal fees but hope to
recover its advances in the three to twelve months that it will take to
foreclose and sell the property. In that event, it will also recover some
additional revenue from late fees once the sale is completed. If the servicer
modifies the mortgage, it will no longer be required to make new advances
(if the borrower resumes and continues payments), but will have to wait a
long time to recover prior advances, unless the homeowner makes a cash
payment at the time of the modification. This is why many servicers insist
on at least recovering attorney fees advanced before modifying a mortgage.
In an environment where financial institutions that service mortgages are
concerned about cash flow, it is apparent why they might prefer to
foreclose: to recover past advances rather than gamble on modifications.
To put it another way, the investor losses may be very large, but the
servicer will almost always benefit by completing a foreclosure sale.
Some PSAs delegate broad discretion to servicers to modify mortgage
terms, including reductions of interest rate or principal debt,55 while others
provide no such discretion or authority at all.56 In the latter case, the
rigidity of the servicer-investor contract prevents any flexibility in
modifying the mortgage loan contract. The PSA itself can usually be
modified, but only with the consent of a supermajority of investors, a
necessarily cumbersome process. The widely publicized suit by investors
against mortgage servicer Countrywide was based on a PSA that did not
permit modifications, unless the servicer repurchased the mortgage loans
before modifying them.57
Even if a servicer is not restricted by the PSA and is willing to defer
recovery of prior advances, it will not modify a mortgage unless it believes
that the modification will produce a greater present value (or smaller loss),
given the risks, than immediate foreclosure. Servicers model the costs and
benefits of modifications by comparing the net present value of projected
55

Id. at § 302.
See, e.g., Sale and Servicing Agreement, Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-1, Saxon Asset
Securities Trust 2006-1, Issuer, Saxon Asset Securities Company, Depositor, Saxon Funding
Management, Inc., Master Servicer, Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., Servicer, and Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas, Indenture Trustee, Apr. 1, 2006, available at http://idea.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1361039/000116231806000629/exhibit991.htm.
57
Vikas Bajaj, Fund Investors Sue Countrywide Over Loan Modifications, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2008, at B8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
56
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cash flow from a modified mortgage with the projected present value of a
foreclosure sale recovery.58 These present value models rely on a large
number of assumptions, often based on history of past performance. One
factor, for example, is the projected redefault rate. If a servicer has a
history of 50% or more redefaults, its present value model will predict
lower cash flow from modified mortgages than if a lower redefault rate is
assumed. Likewise, servicers have to estimate loss severities on future
foreclosures.59 If they use historical data, servicers are likely to
underestimate loss severities and thus tip the scales in favor of foreclosure
and against modification.
Finally, some very practical realities are preventing both the number
and depth of mortgage modifications needed. Servicers are overwhelmed60
and faced with a rapidly changing political and legal environment. Past
habits and groupthink probably play some role in the reluctance to engage
in modifications differently than in the past. New initiatives are announced
by federal agencies monthly, and servicers understandably do not want to
start writing down loans after a taxpayer-funded bailout program.61 These
are just some of the factors that have led to the present impasse.
To get out of the impasse, the mortgage industry needs a coordinated
set of policies that will discourage wasteful foreclosures while offering
clear guidance on how and when to make aggressive and permanent
adjustments to failing mortgage loan contracts. The lessons of 2007 and
2008 can be put to good use if the empirical evidence is used to build
better models of the costs and benefits of modifications and foreclosures.
The federal government, as de facto owner of various failed or failing
financial institutions and manager of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
portfolio of mortgages, is in the best position to establish clear objectives
for the restructuring of America’s mortgage debt. Successful restructuring
would include the reduction of debt to levels that correspond to stable
home values and to the ability of homeowners to repay.
A successful comprehensive set of policies should include the
following. First, the program must include some form of foreclosure
moratorium or selective postponement for the maximum number of
58

AMERICAN SECURITIZATION FORUM, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE MODIFICATION OF SECURITIZED SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS 3–4
(2007), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime %20
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WORKSHEET (2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/loans/loanmod/NPV.xls; MOODY’S
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comparing loan modifications and foreclosure losses).
60
See supra note 32 (discussing the high volume of foreclosures and servicer response).
61
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2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing proposal to provide government
insurance for modified mortgages).
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salvageable mortgages. While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced a
six-week holiday moratorium on November 20, 2008,62 a freeze on
foreclosures needs to last long enough to allow the existing inventory of
foreclosed homes to be sold in an orderly fashion without continually
swelling the inventory. A freeze also needs to allow a genuine and
comprehensive mortgage restructuring to be implemented nationwide, a
process that could certainly take twelve months or more. A moratorium or
delay would obviously need to exclude vacant properties and loans to
borrowers whose income is clearly inadequate to repay any conceivable
modified mortgage.
In conjunction with the postponement of avoidable foreclosures, the
federal banking agencies, including the FDIC and Treasury, must
continually reevaluate and improve the FDIC’s current standardized
approach to mortgage modifications, and deal with the principal debt
reduction issue. The standardized approach to modifying loans should be
applied across the board to all federally-owned mortgages and be mandated
for financial institutions receiving any of the various forms of federal aid.63
Allowing bankruptcy courts to impose mortgage modifications, including
principal reductions to align debt with home values, would be a useful
step.64 On the other hand, the cost of bankruptcy, including legal fees, is
high for debtors,65 and bankruptcy modifications should not be viewed as a
substitute for systematic mortgage restructuring outside of bankruptcy.
The FDIC and other federal agencies should also lead the way by
offering any homeowner with negative equity a principal reduction to be
replaced by a balloon payment that automatically declines by 20% per year
and is reduced to zero after five years. The existing program, consisting of
offering principal deferrals only when needed to reduce payment burdens
without any hope of permanent debt cancellation, fails to offer
homeowners necessary incentives to continue repaying their debt.
Less attractive solutions would include purchases by the Treasury
Department of delinquent mortgages at par or some negotiated discount,
followed by a restructuring and principal reduction similar to what was
done by the Homeowners Loan Corporation in the 1930s. This would shift
the losses investors would otherwise bear to the taxpayer. The government
did not insure mortgage-backed securities, and investors’ risks were
62
Zachary A. Goldfarb, Fannie, Freddie Halt Foreclosures for Holidays, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
2008, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
63
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17, 2008, at A13, available at LEXIS, News Library, LAT File.
64
Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy,
2009 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071931.
65
Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 5, 24–25 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14179, 2008), available at http://www.econ.ucsd.edu/
~miwhite/white-zhu-nber14179.pdf.

2009]

DELEVERAGING THE AMERICAN HOMEOWNER

1131

described in detail in the securitization documents. There is no reason that
investors should not accept the smaller losses of systemic restructuring,
given that they otherwise face the larger (uninsured) losses of massive
foreclosures.
FDIC Chair Sheila Bair’s proposal to insure modified loans against
further default under certain circumstances might offer servicers an
incentive to modify mortgages more aggressively.66 On the other hand,
this proposal amounts to a contingent taxpayer bailout and suffers from the
drawback that servicers are likely to adversely select the riskiest
modifications to include in the insurance program.
A genuine solution to the foreclosure crisis must involve a range of
initiatives, all aimed at bringing existing mortgage debt down to
sustainable levels. The only other option is to continue relying on
voluntary industry efforts while waiting for a housing market recovery,
essentially the Federal government’s response through the end of 2008.
Although banks have written down billions in assets and restored some
capital, borrowers are still crushed by the burden of mortgage debt. Their
continuing struggle is measured in the ever-growing inventory of homes
acquired by mortgage servicers at foreclosure sales that remain unsold, the
pending foreclosures that are not going to sale, and in the hundreds of
thousands of families who are stumbling along in informal forbearance or
in modification agreements that defer and increase their debt.
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